How Georgia prepared for the invasion

KP receives top-secret staff records from the Fourth Georgian Rifle Brigade

Sergey Zelentsov. Viktor Baranets — 21.11.2008

How Georgia prepared for the invasion. Part 2

The war in the South Caucasus in August remains a source of rumors and speculations around the world. The West almost unanimously continues to judge Russia as the aggressor in the conflict, which unjustly "occupied a small, defenseless Georgia." They also persist with their assertions that Russia began the war, and the Russian army prepared military operations long before the outbreak of the war in South Ossetia.

Is this how everything really happened? KP recently received top-secret documents that shed light on the actual state of affairs long before Georgian missiles fell on the rooftops of a sleeping Tskhinvali. These staff records are from the Fourth Georgian Rifle Brigade, which was the main striking force during the conflict. Pay close attention to the dates within, as they reveal the true essence of the situation. We turned to expert Vladimir Artyukhov, a senior officer at a department of the General Staff of Russia's Armed Forces, for commentary.

Secret plots...

Segments of the document, translated from Georgian

Sign over:

Chief of staff

Signature 7.08.08

Top Secret

Cop No.

Staff of the Fourth Rifle Brigade

Vaziani

5.15 7 August 2008

Commentary

Based on the "sequence" of the order, it appears to be almost entirely American. U.S. military advisers, who had been stationed at the army base in Vaziani, really whipped their Georgian "students" into shape. But that's not the most important thing in this issue. What's most important is where it says: "5.15. 7 August." This proves the Georgians were already ready for war a day before combat began.

And reading further on...

Preliminary Order No. 02

Map No. 1:50000, K-38-64-A, K-38-90-B, K-38-64-В,

K-38-64-G

Publication 1987

Local Time

1. Conditions

Without Change (See Preliminary Order No. 01)

А. Adversary Force

Without Change (See Preliminary Order No. 01)

B. Own Force

Without Change (See Preliminary Order No. 01)

Commentary

This is yet another eloquent fact that refutes the lies that have spread that "Russia prepared for the war earlier." The Georgian special forces clearly say for themselves: "Adversary Force — Without Change." And this was Aug. 7! If the Georgians had registered our convoys advancing, would they have written this? Yet Saakashvili continues to lie that the "Russians secretly occupied South Ossetia even as early as Aug. 5..."

Three days for war...

Task of the high commander

The strategic group had 72 hours to implement military actions in Samachablo (ed. South Ossetia), destroy the adversary forces and restore Georgian jurisdiction in the region.

Commentary

You'd agree that if the Georgian generals had any accounts of Russian units being in South Ossetia at the time, they wouldn't have set aside a mere 72 hours to solve the conflict. Even the dumbest Georgian general wouldn't risk such adventurism. They clearly thought our peacekeepers and South Ossetian armed units would be the only forces applying resistance. This is why such a small period of time was set aside for the operations, and you can see this for yourselves in the document.

American devices

Plot of the high commander:

- Quickly implement military actions;

- Decrease risk of destroying civilian population and property;

- Destroy the adversary's force with precision strikes;

- Protect one's own forces.

Commentary

The second point in this section looks a bit odd. It's unclear how these "humane" Georgians intended on lowering the risk of destroying the civilian population and property if they were mercilessly showering Grad missiles on huge areas both in and around Tskhinvali. What precision strikes were they referring to? The Georgian staff jotted this down straight from the U.S. model for staff records. There are no points that say "Protect one's own forces" in Georgian military regulations. This is also an American addition.

Task

Divisions of the Fourth Rifle Brigade were switched to the alert state to support the strategic group at the place of dislocation no later than 11:00, Aug. 7, 2008.

Commentary

Again, "11:00, Aug. 7" is just more evidence that proves the Georgian military machine was launched one day before Saakashvili's troops invaded South Ossetia.

End goals:

- Expose separatist forces in the region;

- Establish a peaceful and secure environment in the region.

Commentary

The term "separatist forces" sounds odd. But it tells us a great deal. Saakashvili's army was afraid of the enemy that would apply resistance. Stress is placed on this idea in other sections of the order, too. The army is speaking out against the "political police," something like a Georgian-style gestapo.

Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR)

(A) Primary Intelligence Requirement (PIR)

1. What are the means/methods/regimes that separatist forces may use to destabilize the security of the region?

2. Where is the immediate confrontation occurring?

3. Who is supporting the separatist forces?

4. Where are the separatist camps and entrenchments?

5. Where is their primary firepower?

6. What is the number of the adversary forces?

7. Where and when will various adversary groups attack our forces?

8. Who are the influential figures within the area of operation?

Commentary

Once upon a time, I had the occasion to hold very similar American documents during the NATO war in Yugoslavia. They were almost identical! This includes the section on "influential figures." This is strictly the American "experience" where military aims are closely connected with politics.

What are they afraid of? The risks...

The danger of separatists mixing with civilian and refugee populations during their movements, which would destabilize the situation at a later point from the rear.

Commentary

As you can see, when the Georgians planned the war themselves. They weren't worried about refugees, but rather "unwanted elements" ending up among their ranks. Cynical morals.

Orders to Support Units:

The brigade support units (tank battalion; artillery division; support battalion and individual squadrons) must enter a state of combat readiness in order to support maneuver elements and prepare to march to the area where the brigade is gathering.

Sq. 0259

Commandeer of the Fourth Rifle Brigade

Signature of Major G. Kalandadze

Commentary

The units enter a state of combat readiness to rapidly transition into military action. This is further evidence about who started the war.

Political Entourage

Top Secret

Exemplar No. 2

Staff of the Fourth Rifle Brigade

Vaziani

1.30 7 August 2008

Preliminary Order No. 01

1. State of Affairs

In the 1990s, the state of affairs in the Samachablo region (ed. South Ossetia) was complicated. The local authorities expelled the Georgian segment of the population with Russia's political assistance. Only Georgians living compactly in the area of Didi-Liakhvi (villages to the north of Tskhinvali) remained in the region. By using political and economic levers, Russia brought peacekeepers into the region, which destabilize the situation and openly support the separatist authorities.

Recently, illegal armed gangs have regularly attacked the Georgian population in the region and opened fire on them using both low- and high-caliber weapons. At the same time, the gangs are continuing to be armed. This increases the level of danger for the Georgian population in the population.

Commentary

Thanks to Russian peacekeepers, a budding war was pacified for more than 10 years in the region. Now Georgia's commandeers have turned everything upside down.

А. Adversary Forces

The Ossetian separatists in the region of Samachablo continue their armed opposition against the civilian population and peacekeeping forces. Their primary tactical techniques are: homemade explosive devices; snipers; homemade missile launchers; 60-82-millimeter mortar launchers; and composite ambushes.

Commentary

And so, it's clear the Fourth Rifle Brigade only saw the Ossetian separatists as their adversaries. Where were the Russian units then? They simply weren't there. So who started the war?

B. Own Forces:

- 41 Rifle Brigade;

- 42 Rifle Brigade;

- 43 Rifle Brigade;

- Armored battalion;

- Artillery division;

- Support battalion;

- Command company;

- Intelligence company;

- Engineering company;

- Radio communication company.

Light Infantry Battalions:

Task: The units must enter a state of combat readiness no later than 11:00 in 2008 (ed. No exact date was given) to depart from the area of the brigade's dislocation and support the strategical group, and conduct actions of stabilization, aggression, and defense.

Artillery Division:

Task: Be prepared to support maneuver units during the operations.

Intelligence Company:

Task: The intelligence company must commence reconnaissance activities in the area of operations from 05.00, Aug. 7, with the aim of studying the locale where the brigade is concentrated.

Commandeer of the Fourth Rifle Brigade

Signature of Major G. Kalandadze

For the review of individual companies

Executed by: G-3 Major Z. Dzhandzhaliya

Tel.: 877-19-39-49

7.08.2008

Commentary

Facts can be interpreted as you like. But documents are irrefutable. And these documents prove what Saakashvili has been denying every step of the way while accusing Russia of starting the war in the Caucasus.

Unfortunately, many politicians simply took his word for the truth. But his word is a lie. The truth is in these orders, which are dated to the hour and minute, and signed by Georgian military personnel.

The truth is that the first shells to fly in the conflict hit civilian homes in Tskhinvali from the Georgian side... The truth is that Saakashvili prepared the war ahead of time... And Russia replied to Georgia's act of provocation and did what it did... But not by choice — and simply because Russia was forced to respond the way that it did.

Читать русскую версию: Как Грузия готовила вторжение