Continued Operation of Los Alamos Megadeath Lab

26 September 2008

[Federal Register: September 26, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 188)]

[Notices]
[Page 55833-55840]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26se08-54]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration


Record of Decision: Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for
Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM

AGENCY: Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of Decision
(ROD) for the continued operation of the Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico. This ROD is based on information and
analyses contained in the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact
Statement for the Continued Operation of Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, DOE/EIS-0380 (Final SWEIS or 2008
SWEIS) issued on May 16, 2008; comments on the SWEIS; and other
factors, including costs, security considerations and the missions of
NNSA.
In the 2008 SWEIS, NNSA assessed three alternatives for the
continued operation of LANL: (1) No Action, (2) Reduced Operations, and
(3) Expanded Operations. The No Action Alternative analyzed in this
SWEIS consists of NNSA and LANL continuing to implement earlier
decisions based on previous National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
reviews, including the 1999 LANL SWEIS (DOE/EIS-0238) and its ROD (64
FR 50797, Sept. 20, 1999). The 2008 SWEIS identified the Expanded
Operations Alternative as NNSA's Preferred Alternative. The SWEIS
includes a classified appendix that assesses the potential
environmental

[[Page 55834]]

impacts of a representative set of credible terrorist scenarios.
Because NNSA is continuing to evaluate significant technical and
national security issues that could affect the operation and missions
of LANL, NNSA is making only a few decisions at this time regarding the
continued operation of the laboratory. NNSA will not make any decisions
regarding nuclear weapons production and other actions analyzed in the
Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (DOE/EIS-0236-S4) (Complex Transformation SPEIS or SPEIS)
prior to the completion of the SPEIS. However, NNSA must make some
decisions now regarding LANL to support the safe and successful
execution of the laboratory's current missions. It is likely that NNSA
will issue other RODs regarding the continued operation of LANL based
on the 2008 SWEIS, the SPEIS and other NEPA analyses.
NNSA has decided to continue to implement the No Action Alternative
with the addition of some elements of the Expanded Operations
Alternative. These elements include increases in operation of some
existing facilities and new facility projects needed for ongoing
programs and protection of workers and the environment. For the most
part, NNSA will continue the missions conducted at LANL at current
levels at this time. NNSA will also continue to implement actions
necessary to comply with the March 2005 Compliance Order on Consent
(Consent Order), which requires investigation and remediation of
environmental contamination at LANL. NNSA will not change pit
production at LANL at this time; the 1999 ROD set pit production at
LANL at 20 per year.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the 2008
LANL SWEIS or this ROD, or to receive a copy of this SWEIS or ROD,
contact: Ms. Elizabeth Withers, Document Manager, U.S. Department of
Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Service Center, Post
Office Box 5400, Albuquerque, NM 87185, (505) 845-4984. Questions about
the SWEIS, ROD and other issues regarding the Los Alamos Site Office's
NEPA compliance program may also be addressed to Mr. George J. Rael,
Assistant Manager Environmental Operations, NEPA Compliance Officer,
U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Los Alamos Site Office, 3747 West Jemez Road, Los Alamos, NM 87544. Mr.
Rael may be contacted by telephone at (505) 665-0308, or by e-mail at:
LASO.SWEIS@doeal.gov. For information on the DOE NEPA process, contact:
Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance
(GC-20), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-
2756. Additional information regarding DOE NEPA activities and access
to many DOE NEPA documents are available on the Internet through the
DOE NEPA Web site at: http://www.gc.energy.gov/nepa/.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

NNSA prepared this ROD pursuant to the regulations of the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) for implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts
1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021).
DOE last issued a SWEIS and ROD for the continued operation of LANL in
1999. DOE's NEPA regulations require that the Department evaluate site-
wide NEPA analyses every five years to determine their continued
applicability; NNSA initiated such an evaluation of the 1999 SWEIS in
2004. It subsequently decided to prepare a new SWEIS. NNSA issued a
Draft SWEIS in July 2006 for public review and comment during a 75-day
period. It considered the comments received on the Draft SWEIS in
preparing the Final SWEIS, which it issued on May 16, 2008.
LANL is a multidisciplinary, multipurpose research institution in
north-central New Mexico, about 60 miles (97 kilometers) north-
northeast of Albuquerque, and about 25 miles (40 kilometers) northwest
of Santa Fe. LANL occupies approximately 25,600 acres (10,360
hectares), or 40 square miles (104 square kilometers). About 2,000
structures, with a total of approximately 8.6 million square feet under
roof, house LANL operations and activities, with about one half of the
area used as laboratory or production space, and the remainder used for
administrative, storage, services, and other purposes.
LANL is one of NNSA's three national security laboratories.
Facilities and expertise at LANL are used to perform science and
engineering research; the laboratory also manufactures some nuclear
weapons components such as plutonium pits. In addition to weapons
component manufacturing, LANL performs weapons testing, stockpile
assurance, component replacement, surveillance, and maintenance. LANL's
research and development activities include high explosives processing,
chemical research, nuclear physics research, materials science
research, systems analysis and engineering, human genome mapping,
biotechnology applications, and remote sensing technologies. The main
role of LANL in the fulfillment of NNSA and DOE missions is scientific
and technological work that supports nuclear materials handling,
processing, and fabrication; stockpile management; materials and
manufacturing technologies; nonproliferation programs; and waste
management activities. Work at LANL is also conducted for other Federal
agencies such as the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, as
well as universities, institutions, and private entities.

Alternatives Considered

The alternatives NNSA evaluated in the SWEIS span a range of
operations from minimum levels that would maintain essential mission
capabilities (Reduced Operations Alternative) through the highest
reasonably foreseeable levels that could be supported by current or new
facilities (Expanded Operations Alternative). The No Action Alternative
evaluated in the SWEIS consists of the continued implementation of
decisions announced in the 1999 SWEIS ROD and decisions based on other
completed NEPA reviews. The Reduced Operations Alternative assumes a
reduction in the levels of certain operations and activities from the
levels evaluated in the No Action Alternative. The Expanded Operations
Alternative includes activities evaluated in the No Action Alternative,
increases in overall operational levels, and new projects that fall
into three categories: (1) Projects to maintain existing operations and
capabilities (such as projects to replace aging structures with modern
ones, and projects to consolidate operations and eliminate unneeded
structures); (2) projects that support environmental remediation at
LANL and compliance with the Consent Order, including demolition of
excess buildings; and (3) projects that add new infrastructure and
expand existing capabilities.

Compliance With the Consent Order

NNSA and LANL will continue to implement actions necessary to
comply with the Consent Order, which requires the investigation and
remediation of environmental contamination at LANL, regardless of the
alternative it selects for the continued operation of the laboratory.
The 2008 SWEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of actions

[[Page 55835]]

required under the Consent Order,\1\ and actions proposed by NNSA to
facilitate its compliance with the Order (such as replacement of waste
management structures, and establishment of waste examination and
staging areas) under the Expanded Operations Alternative so that the
impacts of these actions can be distinguished from the impacts of other
proposed actions.
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\1\ The Consent Order was issued by the New Mexico Environment
Department (NMED). As NMED makes the decisions regarding the
requirements of the Order, these decisions are not subject to NEPA
because they are not ``federal actions.''
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Preferred Alternative

The preferred alternative is the alternative that NNSA believes
would best fulfill its statutory mission responsibilities while giving
consideration to economic, budget, environmental, schedule, policy,
technical and other information. In both the Draft and the Final SWEIS,
NNSA identified the Expanded Operations Alternative as its preferred
alternative.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

NEPA's Section 101 (42 U.S.C. 4331) establishes a policy of federal
agencies having a continuing responsibility to improve and coordinate
their plans, functions, programs and resources so that, among other
goals, the nation may fulfill its responsibilities as a trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations. The Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ), in its ``Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's
NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR 18026, Feb. 23, 1981), defines the
``environmentally preferable alternative'' as the alternative ``that
will promote the national environmental policy expressed in NEPA's
Section 101.''
The analyses in the SWEIS of the environmental impacts associated
with operating LANL identified only minor differences among the three
alternatives across natural and cultural resource areas. Within each of
the alternatives there are actions that could result in negative
impacts, as well as those that would produce positive environmental
effects. Considering the many environmental facets of the alternatives
analyzed in the SWEIS, and looking out over the long term, NNSA
believes that implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative
would allow it to best achieve its environmental trustee
responsibilities under Section 101 of NEPA. Facilitating the cleanup of
the site with new or expanded waste management facilities, and
replacing older laboratory and production facilities with new buildings
that incorporate modern safety, security and efficiency standards,
would improve LANL's ability to protect human health and the
environment while allowing LANL to continue to fulfill its national
security missions. Increasing operational levels and performing various
demolition activities would use additional resources and generate
additional waste, but NNSA would also undertake actions to modernize
and replace older facilities with more energy efficient and
environmentally-protective facilities and to implement waste control
and environmental practices to minimize impacts. Many of these types of
actions are not feasible with the outdated infrastructure currently at
LANL. Under this alternative, NNSA would be better positioned to
minimize the use of electricity and water, streamline operations
through consolidation, reduce the ``footprint'' of LANL as a whole, and
allow some areas to return to a natural state.

NNSA's Responsibilities to Tribal Governments

NNSA recognizes that the operation of LANL over the last 65 years
has affected the people of neighboring communities in northern New
Mexico, including Tribal communities. These effects, which vary in
nature across communities, include alterations of lifestyles,
community, and individual practices. With respect to Tribal
communities, NNSA adheres to federal statutes such as the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act,
and the National Historic Preservation Act. NNSA follows Executive
Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments; Executive Order 13007, Indian Sacred Sites; Executive
Order 13021, Tribal Colleges and Universities; and Executive Order
12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations. NNSA also follows the 2004
Presidential Memorandum regarding Government-to-Government
Relationships with Native American Tribal Governments, DOE's American
Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Government Policy, DOE Order 1230.2 and
DOE Notice 144.1, which establish principles and policies for the
Department's relations with Tribes. NNSA has established cooperative
agreements with Tribal nations that are located near NNSA sites to
enhance their involvement in environmental restoration while protecting
Tribal rights and resources.
Four Pueblo governments in the vicinity of LANL have signed
individual Accord Agreements with NNSA (Santa Clara, San Ildefonso,
Cochiti, and Jemez). The Accord Agreements, together with the recently
established Environmental Management/NNSA tribal framework, provide a
basis for conducting government-to-government relations and serve as a
foundation for addressing issues of mutual concern between the
Department and the Pueblos. In furtherance of these Accord Agreements,
and specifically to address concerns and issues raised by the Santa
Clara Pueblo, the implementation of the decisions in this ROD will be
undertaken in conjunction with a Mitigation Action Plan (MAP), which
will be updated as needed to address specific concerns and issues
raised by the Santa Clara and other Tribal communities.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

NNSA analyzed the potential impacts of each alternative on land
use; visual resources; site infrastructure; air quality; noise; geology
and soils; surface and groundwater quality; ecological resources;
cultural and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health
impacts; environmental justice; and waste management and pollution
prevention. NNSA also evaluated the impacts of each alternative as to
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources, and the
relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity. In addition, it
evaluated impacts of potential accidents at LANL on workers and
surrounding populations. In a classified appendix, NNSA also evaluated
the potential impacts of intentional destructive acts that might occur
at LANL.
The 2008 SWEIS's impact analyses for normal operations (i.e.,
operations without accidents or intentional destructive acts)
identified the most notable differences in potential environmental
impacts among the alternatives in the following resource areas: geology
and soils; radiological air quality; human health; site infrastructure
(electric power use, natural gas demand, potable water demand, and
waste management demands); and transportation. It also identified minor
differences in potential environmental impacts among the alternatives
under normal operations for: land use; visual environment; surface
water resources; groundwater resources; non-radiological air quality;
noise levels; ecological resources; cultural resources; and
socioeconomics.

[[Page 55836]]

These findings are described in the Summary and Chapters 4 and 5 of the
SWEIS.
Environmental justice was an impact area of particular concern
among those who commented on the SWEIS. NNSA recognizes that the
operation of LANL over the last 65 years has affected the people of
neighboring communities, including minority and low-income households.
These effects, which vary in nature across communities, include
alterations of lifestyles, community, and individual practices.
Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, requires every
Federal agency to analyze whether its proposed actions and alternatives
would have disproportionately high and adverse impacts on minority or
low-income populations. Based on the impacts analysis, NNSA expects no
disproportionately high and adverse impacts on minority or low-income
populations from the continued operation of LANL under any of the
alternatives. From the analysis conducted of the alternatives, the
radiological dose from emissions from normal operations are slightly
lower for members of Hispanic, Native American, total minority, and
low-income populations than for members of the population that are not
in these groups, mainly because of the locations of these populations
relative to the operations at LANL that produce these emissions. The
maximum annual dose for the average member of any of the minority or
low-income populations is estimated to be 0.092 millirem compared to a
dose of 0.10 millirem for a member of the general population, and a
dose of 0.11 millirem for a member of the population that does not
belong to a minority or low-income group.
NNSA also analyzed human health impacts from exposure through
special pathways, including subsistence consumption of native
vegetation (pi[ntilde]on nuts and Indian Tea [Cota]), locally grown
produce and farm products, groundwater, surface waters, fish (game and
nongame), game animals, other foodstuffs and incidental consumption of
soils and sediments (on produce, in surface water, and from ingestion
of inhaled dust). These special pathways can be important to the
environmental justice analyses because some of them may be more
important or prevalent as to the traditional and cultural practices of
members of minority populations in the area. The analyses conducted for
the 2008 SWEIS, however, show that the health impacts associated with
these special pathways do not result in disproportionately high and
adverse impacts to minority or low-income populations.
The SWEIS analyzed potential accidents at LANL. Bounding accidents
for both nuclear materials handling and waste management operations and
for chemical handling and waste management operations, were identified
as those with the highest potential consequences to the offsite
population under median site meteorological conditions. Chemicals of
concern were selected from a database based on quantities, chemical
properties, and human health effects. In making the decisions announced
in this ROD, NNSA considered the potential accidents analyzed in the
SWEIS for each of the three alternative levels of LANL operations. For
the most part, there are few differences among the alternatives for the
maximum potential wildfire, seismic, or facility operational accident
at LANL because actions under each alternative do not, for the most
part, affect the location, frequency, or material at risk of the
analyzed accident scenarios. Potential accidents that could occur under
the No Action Alternative could also occur under both the Reduced
Operations and the Expanded Operations Alternatives. In general, TA-54
waste management operations dominate the potential radiological
accident risks and consequences at LANL under all three alternatives.
Under both the No Action and the Reduced Operations Alternatives,
the accident with the highest estimated consequences to offsite
populations involving radioactive material or wastes is a lightning-
initiated fire at the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Facility in
TA-54. Such an accident could result in up to 6 additional latent
cancer fatalities (LCFs) in the offsite population. A fire at the
Plutonium Facility's material staging area located within TA-55 could
result in up to 5 additional LCFs in the offsite population. The
potential accident expected to result in the highest estimated
consequences to the hypothetical maximally exposed individual (MEI) and
a non-involved nearby worker would be a fire in a waste storage dome at
TA-54. If that accident were to occur, a single LCF to a noninvolved
worker located 110 yards (100 meters) away from the site of the
accident would be likely, and there could also be a 1 in 2 likelihood
(0.50) of a LCF to the MEI, who is assumed to be located at the nearest
site boundary for the duration of the accident. The lightning-initiated
fire accident at the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Facility
could also result in a single LCF to a noninvolved worker located 110
yards (100 meters) away from the site of the accident, and could also
result in about the same 1 in 2 likelihood (0.49) of a LCF to the MEI
assumed to be located at the nearest boundary for the duration of the
accident.
Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, there is a potential for
a radiological accident unique to this alternative. The radiological
accident most likely to result in the highest estimated consequences to
the offsite population is a building fire involving radioactive sealed
sources stored at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. Such
an accident could result in up to 7 additional LCFs in the offsite
population. The potential accident expected to result in the highest
estimated consequences to the hypothetical MEI and a non-involved
nearby worker would be the same as for the No Action Alternative,
namely, a fire in a waste storage dome at TA-54.
DOE evaluates the exposure risks associated with chemicals of
concern and the requirements for crisis response personnel to use
personal protection to avoid potentially dangerous exposures through
its system of Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG). Chemicals
of concern in the analyzed accidents at LANL under both the No Action
and Reduced Operations Alternatives include selenium hexafluoride and
sulfur dioxide, both from waste cylinder storage at TA-54, and chlorine
and helium gases located at TA-55. Annual risks of worker and public
exposure in the event of chemical releases are greatest from chlorine
and helium gases. The annual risk is estimated to be about one chance
in 15 years for workers within 1,181 yards (1,080 meters) of the
facility receiving exposures in excess of the ERPG limits for chlorine
gas, with the nearest public access located at 1,111 yards (1,016
meters). The annual risk is estimated to be about one chance in 15
years for workers within 203 yards (186 meters) of the facility
receiving exposures in excess of ERPG limits for helium gas, with the
nearest public access at 1,146 yards (1,048 meters).
Cleanup activities of Material Disposal Areas (MDAs) are analyzed
under the Expanded Operations Alternative. These activities pose a risk
of accidental releases of toxic chemicals, as there is a degree of
uncertainty about how much and what chemicals were disposed of in the
MDAs. MDA B is the closest disposal area to the boundary of LANL that
will require remediation; remediation by waste removal was assumed for
the analysis of a bounding accidental chemical release. Sulfur

[[Page 55837]]

dioxide gas and beryllium powder were chosen as the bounding chemicals
of concern for this area based on their ERPG values. If present at MDA
B in the quantities assumed, both of these chemicals would likely
dissipate to safe levels very close to the point of their release.
However, there is a potential risk to the public due to the short
distance between MDA B and the nearest point where a member of the
public might be.

Comments on the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement

NNSA distributed more than 1,030 copies of the Final SWEIS to
Congressional members and committees, the State of New Mexico, Tribal
governments and organizations, local governments, other Federal
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and individuals. NNSA
received comments on the Final SWEIS from the Santa Clara Indian
Pueblo; the Members and Residents of Santa Clara Pueblo; Concerned
Citizens for Nuclear Safety, together with Robert H. Gilkeson and the
Embudo Valley Environmental Monitoring Group; Citizen Action New
Mexico; Nuclear Watch New Mexico; Citizens for Alternatives to
Radioactive Dumping, and from nearby farmers.
Comments on the Final SWEIS included issues already raised during
the comment period for the Draft SWEIS. Volume 3 of the Final SWEIS
contains all comments received on the Draft SWEIS and NNSA's responses
to them; this chapter also describes how these comments resulted in
changes to the SWEIS.
The Santa Clara Indian Pueblo identified three main areas of
concern: (1) Government-to-government consultation should have taken
place before the issuance of the Final SWEIS; (2) environmental justice
issues (including cumulative impacts) were not analyzed properly in the
Final SWEIS; and (3) going forward with an increase in plutonium pit
production at this time would be premature and violate NEPA. In a
letter signed by 226 individuals, the Members and Residents of the
Santa Clara Pueblo stated their support for comments on the SWEIS
submitted by the tribal leaders. They also stated their opposition to
increased plutonium pit production and specifically asked ``that (1)
proper analysis of environmental justice and accumulative impacts be
completed and circulated to the public for comments; (2) that NNSA/DOE
honor government-to-government consultation and the process as a trust
to Indian Tribes (Santa Clara Pueblo); and (3) that no decision about
increasing plutonium pit production be made until review of this issue
mandated in a new law (the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008) is completed.''
To the extent that Santa Clara Pueblo perceived NNSA's action in
delaying government-to-government consultation until after the issuance
of the Final SWEIS and before the issuance of this ROD to be
inconsistent with appropriate protocol for such consultations, this was
not intended. NNSA believes that it followed the requirements of DOE
Order 1230.2, U.S. Department of Energy American Indian and Alaska
Native Tribal Government Policy, in consulting through the formal
government-to-government process with Santa Clara Pueblo prior to
making the decisions announced in this ROD. However, given the two-year
time period between the issuance of the Draft SWEIS in 2006 and the
issuance of the Final SWEIS in 2008, NNSA acknowledges that it could
have been more prompt in engaging in government-to-government
consultation with the Santa Clara Pueblo. NNSA will work to improve its
consultation process.
With regard to the impact analysis of environmental justice issues
(including cumulative impacts) in the Final SWEIS, NNSA believes that
it appropriately analyzed the potential for disproportionately high and
adverse impacts to minority and low-income populations located within a
50-mile radius of LANL under all alternatives, and that it also
appropriately analyzed cumulative impacts to the extent that future
actions are known or foreseeable. However, NNSA recognizes that many of
the concerns the Santa Clara expressed are rooted in protected cultural
and religious practices of its people. With this in mind, NNSA will
undertake implementation of the decisions announced in this ROD in
conjunction with a MAP. The MAP will be updated as the need arises to
identify actions that would address specific concerns and issues raised
by the Santa Clara as well as those of other tribal entities in the
area of LANL.
NNSA agrees that decisions at this time on proposed actions
analyzed in the Complex Transformation SPEIS, including decisions
regarding the number of plutonium pits LANL will produce, would be
premature. NNSA will not make any decisions on pit production until
after it completes the SPEIS.
Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, together with Robert H.
Gilkeson and the Embudo Valley Environmental Monitoring Group, raised
several concerns with the Final SWEIS: issuance of the Final SWEIS is
premature because there could be a future Congressional change in the
purpose and need to operate LANL; there is an uncertain seismic hazard
at LANL; the Final SWEIS does not comply with NEPA because it omitted
an analysis of prime farmland; LANL does not have a reliable network of
monitoring wells; radionuclides have been found in the drinking water
wells of Los Alamos County, San Ildefonso Pueblo, and Santa Fe; and
storm flow and sediment transport are primary mechanisms for potential
contaminant transport beyond LANL's boundaries.
NNSA does not agree that issuance of the Final SWEIS and a ROD is
premature. Should Congress or the President direct changes regarding
the purpose and need to operate LANL, NNSA may need to conduct
additional NEPA reviews or amend this ROD. Federal agencies always face
the possibility that in the future the Congress or the President may
direct changes in their missions and responsibilities. At this time,
NNSA is making only a limited set of decisions regarding actions that
need to be implemented now. These decisions do not limit or prejudice
the decisions NNSA may make regarding the programmatic alternatives it
is evaluating in the Complex Transformation SPEIS.
New information about seismic risks at LANL (set forth in the
report Update of the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis and
Development of Seismic Design Ground Motions at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, 2007, LA-UR-07-3965) may change how hazardous materials are
stored, operations are conducted, and facilities are constructed or
renovated. NNSA is conducting a systematic review of LANL structures
and operations in light of this information. This review, expected to
be completed in about one year, will identify any necessary changes to
address the new seismic information. NNSA will then implement the
necessary changes to LANL facilities and operations based on the
review's recommendations.
NNSA contacted the U.S. Department of Agriculture regarding prime
farmland designations in northern New Mexico and included that
information in Chapter 4 of the Final SWEIS. No farmland designated by
that agency as ``prime farmland'' is located within Los Alamos or Santa
Fe Counties, and only a limited amount of prime farmland is located
within a 50-mile radius of LANL in Sandoval and Rio Arriba Counties.
The Farmland Protection Policy Act requires that projects receiving
Federal funds that would result in the

[[Page 55838]]

permanent conversion of prime farmland to non-farmland (or remove its
prime rating) must develop and consider alternatives that would not
result in the conversion. None of the proposed actions at LANL under
any of the alternatives would result in changes to any designated prime
farmland or cause it to be re-designated as non-prime farmland.
Information about the network of monitoring wells, including
existing and planned wells, is provided in Chapter 4 of the Final
SWEIS. NNSA acknowledges that past well installation practices have not
produced the desired network, and will continue to install and
refurbish wells until adequate information is obtained regarding
groundwater conditions and contaminant transport within the aquifers in
the LANL area. Contaminants identified in various drinking water wells
are being monitored, and drinking water production from these wells may
be adjusted or discontinued in compliance with health protection
standards. Additional study of aquifer conditions and contaminant
transport is needed before long-term corrective actions can be
identified and implemented. Contaminant transport via surface water
flow and sediment transport is recognized as the primary mechanisms for
off-site transport, especially after storms. As the watershed recovers
from the effects of the Cerro Grande Fire in 2000, the volumes of storm
water runoff are expected to decrease.
Citizen Action New Mexico stated its opposition to the Expanded
Operations Alternative, especially expanded nuclear weapons research
and production, and asserted that the Final SWEIS did not consider the
increased impact of plutonium production on children in compliance with
Executive Order 13045, Protection of Children from Environmental Health
Risks and Safety Risks.
NNSA believes it has complied with this Executive Order in the
Final SWEIS. NNSA now uses a more conservative dose-to-risk conversion
factor in assessing risks of radiation exposures as a result of this
Order. Use of the new dose-to-risk conversion factor is one of the
changes noted in NNSA's NEPA process since the issuance of the 1999
SWEIS (Chapter 6 and Appendix C of the SWEIS). As noted previously,
NNSA is not making any decisions at this time that would result in
expansion of nuclear weapons production.
In comments on the Final SWEIS, Nuclear Watch New Mexico (NWNM)
stated that: Expanded plutonium pit production is not necessary;
potential impacts of the proposed Radiological Science Institute are
not adequately analyzed in the Final SWEIS and that a project-specific
EIS is necessary for the institute; waste volumes identified in the
Final SWEIS do not reconcile with those in NNSA's Draft Complex
Transformation Supplemental Programmatic EIS; there is confusion about
whether the proposed Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility, which is the subject
of another DOE programmatic EIS, The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
Programmatic EIS (the GNEP PEIS), would be used for research and
development or for full-scale reprocessing (and the number of
associated facilities that could be located at LANL); and the Los
Alamos Science Complex should be funded through the traditional
Congressional budgetary authorization and appropriation process.
NNSA believes that it appropriately analyzed the potential impacts
of the Radiological Science Institute in the Final SWEIS to the extent
possible at this stage of the project planning process, and
acknowledged in the Final SWEIS that additional NEPA analyses may be
necessary if NNSA decides to continue with this proposal. NNSA will
reconcile and update waste volumes in the Final Complex Transformation
SPEIS. DOE has decided to eliminate the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility
from consideration in the GNEP PEIS (for more information, please
visit: http://www.gnep.energy.gov). NNSA is considering the use of
alternative financing for the Los Alamos Science Complex; this is an
appropriate financing approach in certain situations although it has
been rarely used at LANL.
NWNM also asked for additional clarification of some of NNSA's
responses to its comments on the Draft SWEIS and provided additional
information regarding some of their previous comments. Specifically,
NWNM asked if all current tests using plutonium at the Dual Axis
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) are conducted inside
vessels.
At present, NNSA is not conducting any tests at DARHT that use
plutonium, and future tests using plutonium at this facility would be
conducted inside vessels.
NWNM asked if the Rendija Canyon Fault is the closest fault to the
proposed location of the Radiological Science Institute.
As discussed in the Final SWEIS, it is the closest known fault to
that location.
NWNM also requested an unclassified appendix that discusses
intentional destructive acts at LANL; asserted there should be a
citation to information compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce's
Bureau of Economic Analysis; and asked that the Area G Performance
Assessment and Composite Analysis and the geotechnical report recently
prepared by LANL be posted on the Internet.
NNSA considered the preparation of an unclassified discussion of
the potential environmental impacts of intentional destructive acts at
LANL, but concluded that such a discussion posed unacceptable security
risks. Information used to prepare the economic impacts analysis was
not contained within a discrete study, so a citation is not appropriate
in this instance. Unclassified documents prepared by LANL are generally
placed on its Internet site when completed and approved for
distribution. NWNM may access the LANL Internet site for these specific
references.
NWNM correctly pointed out that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) had designated the Espa[ntilde]ola Basin as a Sole Source Aquifer
in early 2008.
Once EPA designates a sole source aquifer under its Sole Source
Aquifer Protection Program, the agency can review proposed projects
that are to receive Federal funds and that have a potential to
contaminate the aquifer. Under this review, EPA can request changes to
a Federally-funded project if it poses a threat to public health by
contaminating an aquifer to the point where a safe drinking water
standard could be violated. Projects conducted entirely by Federal
agencies, or their contractors, at sole source aquifer locations are
not subject to EPA's review process. NNSA is not proposing any new
projects that would cause the Espa[ntilde]ola Basin aquifer to exceed a
safe drinking water standard.
Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping also commented on
the Final SWEIS. It asserted that expanded pit production is not
necessary; that contamination has been found in produce samples; that
there is prime farm land in the Embudo Valley; that there are
radionuclides in the Rio Grande, which is a threat to its use as
drinking water by the city of Santa Fe; and that radioactive cesium has
been found in soils at the Trampas Lakes, which drain into the Rio
Grande.
As NNSA noted in its response to other comments on the Draft SWEIS,
a single ``false positive'' result was returned from a laboratory
analyzing fruit specimens grown near LANL. No uptake of radioactive
contamination

[[Page 55839]]

attributed to LANL operations has been found in produce samples
obtained from the Embudo Valley. Drinking water supplies for Santa Fe
must meet Safe Drinking Water Act and other state and municipal
requirements. Elevated radionuclide concentrations in the soils of
alpine lake basins within the Rocky Mountain range have been attributed
to global fallout concentrated through snowfall and specific geomorphic
conditions.

Decisions

With limited additions, NNSA has decided to continue operation of
Los Alamos National Laboratory pursuant to the No Action Alternative
analyzed in the 2008 SWEIS. The parameters of this alternative are set
by the 1999 ROD and other decisions that NNSA has made previously
regarding the continued operation of LANL. The additions to the No
Action Alternative NNSA has decided to implement at this time consist
of elements of the Expanded Operations Alternative. These elements are
of two types: (1) Changes in the level of operations for on-going
activities within existing facilities, and (2) new facility projects.
The changes in operational levels NNSA has decided to implement at this
time are:
Supporting the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Off-
Site Sources Recovery Project by broadening the types and quantities of
radioactive sealed sources (Co-60, Ir-192, Cf-252, Ra-226) that LANL
can manage and store prior to their disposal;
Expanding the capabilities and operational level of the
Nicholas C. Metropolis Center for Modeling and Simulation to support
the Roadrunner Super Computer platform;
Performing research to improve beryllium detection and to
develop mitigation methods for beryllium dispersion to support
industrial health and safety initiatives for beryllium workers; and
Retrieval and disposition of legacy transuranic waste
(approximately 3,100 cubic yards of contact-handled and 130 cubic yards
of remote-handled) from belowground storage.
New facility projects involve the design, construction, or
renovation of facilities and were analyzed as part of the Expanded
Operations Alternative. The facility projects that NNSA has decided to
pursue at this time are:
Planning, design, construction and operation of the Waste
Management Facilities Transition projects to facilitate actions
required by the Consent Order;
Repair and replacement of mission critical cooling system
components for buildings in TA-55 to enable the continued operation of
these buildings and to comply with current environmental standards; and
Final design of a new Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment
Facility, and design and construction of the Zero Liquid Discharge
Facility component of this new treatment facility to enable LANL to
continue to treat radioactive liquid wastes.
These projects and actions are needed on an immediate basis to
maintain existing capabilities, support existing programs, and provide
a safe and environmentally protective work environment at LANL. The
need for these increases in operations and new facility projects exists
regardless of any decisions NNSA may make regarding the programmatic
and project-specific alternatives analyzed in the Complex
Transformation SPEIS.
In addition, NNSA will continue to implement actions required by
the Consent Order, as noted above, these decisions are not subject to
NEPA.

Basis for Decision

NNSA's decisions are based on its mission responsibilities and its
need to sustain LANL's ability to operate in a manner that allows it to
fulfill its existing responsibilities in an environmentally sound,
timely and fiscally prudent manner.
National security policies require NNSA to maintain the nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile as well as its core competencies in nuclear
weapons. Since completion in 1996 of the Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM PEIS)
and associated ROD, NNSA and its predecessor, DOE's Office of Defense
Programs, has implemented these policies through the Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP). The SSP emphasizes development and
application of improved scientific and technical capabilities to assess
the safety, security, and reliability of existing nuclear warheads
without the use of nuclear testing. LANL's operations support a wide
range of scientific and technological capabilities for NNSA's national
security missions, including the SSP. Most of NNSA's missions require
research and development capabilities that currently reside at the LANL
site. The nuclear facilities in LANL's TA-55 must maintain the nation's
nuclear stockpile. Programmatic risks would be unacceptable if LANL did
not continue to operate, or if it failed to implement the new decisions
set forth above.
NNSA believes that, at this time, existing national security
requirements can be met by continuing to conduct operations at current
levels with only a limited number of increases in levels of operations
and new facility projects. These increases in operations and new
projects are needed because of changes in the SSP program and NNSA's
nuclear non-proliferation program. They are also needed to meet new
responsibilities that have arisen as a result of changes in our
national security requirements since 1999. One of the new facility
projects is needed to facilitate NNSA's compliance with the Consent
Order. The specific rationales for NNSA's decisions to implement seven
elements of the Expanded Operations Alternative are:
1. Supporting the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Off-Site
Sources Recovery Project by broadening the types and quantities of
radioactive sealed sources (Co-60, Ir-192, Cf-252, Ra-226) that LANL
can manage and store prior to their disposal--This decision will allow
NNSA to retrieve and store more of these sources, which, if not
adequately secured, could be used in a radiation dispersion device (a
``dirty bomb'').
2. Expanding the capabilities and operational level of the Nicholas
C. Metropolis Center for Modeling and Simulation to support the
Roadrunner Super Computer platform--This decision will allow NNSA to
perform calculations that improve its ability to certify that the
nuclear weapons stockpile is reliable without conducting underground
nuclear tests. It will also allow LANL to conduct research on global
energy challenges and other scientific issues.
3. Performing research to improve detection and mitigation methods
for beryllium--This research will support the continued development of
methods to capture and sequester beryllium and to expedite sample
analysis needed to implement exposure controls to ensure worker safety.
4. Retrieval and disposition of legacy transuranic waste
(approximately 3,100 cubic yards of contact-handled and 130 cubic yards
of remote-handled) from belowground storage--Retrieving and
dispositioning this waste will allow LANL to complete closure and
remediation of TA-54 Material Disposal Area G under the Consent Order.
This action will reduce risk by removing approximately 105,000
plutonium-239 equivalent curies from LANL.
5. Planning, design, construction and operation of the Waste
Management Facilities Transition projects--These projects will replace
LANL's existing facilities for solid waste management. The existing
facilities at TA-54 for transuranic waste, low-level waste, mixed low-
level waste and hazardous/

[[Page 55840]]

chemical waste are scheduled for closure and remediation under the
Consent Order.
6. Repair and replacement of mission critical cooling system
components for buildings in TA-55--This decision will allow these
facilities to continue to operate and for NNSA to install a new cooling
system that meets current standards regarding the phase-out of Class 1
ozone-depleting substances.
7. Final design of a new Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment
Facility, and design and construction of the Zero Liquid Discharge
Facility component of this new treatment facility--This decision will
allow LANL to continue to treat radioactive liquid wastes by replacing
a facility that does not meet current standards and that cannot be
acceptably renovated. Regardless of any decisions NNSA may make about
complex transformation and LANL's role in it, the laboratory will need
to treat liquid radioactive wastes for the foreseeable future.

Mitigation Measures

As described in the SWEIS, LANL operates under environmental laws,
regulations, and policies within a framework of contractual
requirements; many of these requirements mandate actions intended to
control and mitigate potential adverse environmental effects. Examples
include the Environment, Safety, and Health Manual, emergency plans,
Integrated Safety Management System, pollution prevention and waste
minimization programs, protected species programs, and energy and
conservation programs. A Mitigation Action Plan for this ROD will be
issued that includes: Specific habitat conservation measures
recommended by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for mitigating
effects to potential habitat areas; site- and action-specific
commitments related to the Consent Order once the State of New Mexico
decides on specific environmental remediation for LANL MDAs; and
traffic flow improvements that could involve such measures as
installing turn lanes, installing and coordinating traffic lights, and
installing new signage. A summary of all prior mitigation commitments
for LANL that are either underway or that have yet to be initiated will
be included in the MAP. These prior commitments include such actions as
continued forest management efforts, continued trail management
measures, and implementation of a variety of sampling and monitoring
measures, as well as additional measures to reduce potable water use
and conserve resources.
In addition, with respect to the concerns raised by the Santa Clara
Pueblo, NNSA will continue its efforts to support the Pueblo and other
tribal entities in matters of human health, and will participate in
various intergovernmental cooperative efforts to protect indigenous
practices and locations of concern. NNSA will conduct government-to-
government consultation with the Pueblo and other tribal entities to
incorporate these matters into the MAP.

Issued at Washington, DC, this 19th day of September 2008.
Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
[FR Doc. E8-22678 Filed 9-25-08; 8:45 am]