How to Destroy an Industrial Complex
If we are talking about militarism -- an overgrown military establishment, a proclivity for war, and runaway executive power, all justified by exaggerated security concerns -- then I agree that we have a problem. But the problem results not because we can't sustain this posture but because we can.
We are still rich as hell, despite our current trouble, which is not a result of military spending or war in any case. Despite George Bush's assaults on our civil liberties, our freedoms are essentially intact; we vote and speak as we like. And the vast majority of us are safe and secure. The danger of war does not touch us.
When Harold Lasswell warned long ago about the danger of a garrison state, this is what he misunderstood. Our economy is so productive that we can pay for a massive military establishment and still be free and prosperous. Sure, we are a little less free and prosperous as a result, but for those of us who do not fight our wars, it is a small sacrifice.
This is the trouble. The costs of militarism are distributed among the population and the benefits are concentrated in what we call the military industrial complex, a way of describing a group of people who benefit from preparation for war-- not, I argue -- war itself. Because these people dominate our discourse about security, they teach us to be unduly afraid and attached to military means of solving our problems. They create a militarized ideology, which primes us for war. That is the thesis of Jack Snyder's classic book, Myths of Empire. Note that a set of interests incentivized to prepare for war is a good thing to have while dangers are large. But when they fade, the complex does not, and it generates support for itself.
What's the solution? Not cutting consumption, as Andrew Bacevich (who taught me much about militarism) argues. Importing oil does not require heavy military spending -- wrong-headed economic ideas about the need to "secure" Middle-Eastern energy supply do.
Nor does salvation lie in the reorganization of our national security institutions, via a new National Security Act, as Eugene suggests in the conclusion of his book. (It is surprising that Eugene, who is so critical of Washington, adopts one of its worst conceits, the idea that every policy problem has a solution in the organization of the executive branch). The National Security Act of 1947, on which Eugene pins so much blame, is a consequence of the problem he describes, a large peace-time military establishment, not its cause.
The solution lies in three things: international politics, Congressional power, and the conflict of interests favoring militarism with other interests.
Realists believe that states that act unwisely abroad ultimately get burned. That has happened, tragically, in Iraq and, increasingly, in Afghanistan. It's true that bad wars do not cost most people, but they do tend to discredit the ideology that justified them. Unfortunately, the tendency to mythologize the surge is teaching Americans the wrong lessons about Iraq. We may need to repeat the experience before we learn the limits of our power.
Congress could relearn its constitutional responsibilities, remembering the invitation that the Constitution gives them to struggle for war powers. (The irony of self-described strict constructionists on the right debasing Congress' war powers is rich.) This outcome is unlikely, however, without divided government.
Third, the military industrial complex may conflict with other concentrated interests. As federal revenue drops and entitlement costs rise, there is bound to be a reckoning between competing spending priorities with powerful backers. Greater federal spending on health care would accelerate that reckoning. That could cause a public fight about what our biggest threats are. Americans might decide that they'd rather have prescription drugs than imperial commitments.
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